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DIVORCE REFORM AND THE LEGACY OF
GENDER
Milton C Regan, Jr.*
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM. By Martha Albertson Fineman. Chicago: Univer-

sity of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 252. $27.50.
I.

GENDER AND DIVORCE

A growing body of evidence indicates that the economic consequences of divorce are far worse for women than for men. 1 While data
for periods earlier than the past two decades are sparse, there is every
reason to believe that this disparity is not a recent phenomenon. Alimony historically has been awarded to women in a relatively small
percentage of cases. 2 Furthermore, until recently, the vast majority of
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1976, Houston;
M.A. 1978, UCLA; J.D. 1985, Georgetown. - Ed. I would like to thank Judy Areen, Margret
Brinig, Marsha Garrison, Nancy Sachs, Carl Schneider, Robin West, and Joan Williams for their
helpful comments on a draft of this book review.
1. See, e.g.. BARBARA BAKER, FAMILY EQUITY AT lssUE (1987); LISA J. BRETT ET AL.,
WOMEN AND CHILDREN BEWARE (1990); GLORIA J. STERIN ET AL., DIVORCE AWARDS AND
OUTCOMES (1981); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); Saul Hoffman
& John Holmes, Husbands, Wives and Divorce, in 4 FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES PATTERNS OF EcONOMIC PROGRESS 23 (Greg J. Duncan & James N. Morgan eds., 1976); Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22
FAM. L.Q. 225 (1988); Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic
Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485 (1985); Thomas J. Espenshade, The
Economic Consequences ofDivorce, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 615 (1979); Marsha Garrison, Good
Intentions Gone Awry: How New York's Equitable Distribution Law Affected Divorce Outcomes,
57 BROOKLYN L. REv. 619 (1991); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal· The Economic
Disaster ofDivorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987); Karen Seal, A Decade of
No-Fault Divorce: What It Has Meant Financially for Women in California, 1 FAM. ADv. 10
(1979); Charles E. Welch, III & Sharon Price-Bonham, A Decade ofNo-Fault Divorce Revisited:
California, Georgia, and Washington, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 411 (1983); Heather R. Wishik,
Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986).
Lenore Weitzman's study probably has received the most attention; for critiques of it, see Jed
H. Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. ILL.
L. REv. 251 (1989); Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences
ofDivorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988); Herbert Jacob, Another Laok at No-Fault Divorce and
the Post-Divorce Finances of Women, 23 LAW & SocY. REv. 95 (1989); Review Symposium on
Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 757. As Joan Krauskopf observes,
"[e]ven those who criticize Weitzman's figures differ on amount, not on significant disparity in
standard of living between ex-husbands and ex-wives." Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories ofProperty
Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 271 n.65
(1988).
2. See WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW
YORK CITY 340-43 (1953); Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does NoFault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 143 (1980).
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states were common law property states that divided property at divorce according to title, a practice that significantly favored men and
their greater access to market resources. 3
More controversial is the question whether the recent series of
changes associated with no-fault divorce has worsened this situation.
These changes commonly, although not uniformly: provided for unilateral divorce without proof of fault; expanded the definition of property available for distribution between spouses and directed that it be
divided "equitably"; created a presumption that alimony is available
only in extraordinary circumstances and then is limited to a period
sufficient to "rehabilitate" the recipient's market prospects; and eliminated custody presumptions favoring mothers.4 A less widespread,
but still significant, trend has been the elimination in many states of
marital fault as a consideration in determinations regarding property,s
alimony, 6 and custody. 7
Some scholars argue that a system in which divorce was available
only for proof of fault provided women bargaining leverage, affording
them the opportunity to extract economic concessions in return for
agreement to cooperate in obtaining a divorce. 8 Others challenge this
thesis, maintaining that changes in property and alimony rules, rather
than in the grounds for divorce, have made women's financial position
more precarious. 9 Still others acknowledge that women are worse off
than they were before divorce reform, but question whether we can
3. Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980s, 44 LA. L. REV. 1SS3, 1SSS-S7
(1984); Jacob, supra note 1, at 96.
4. See generally MARY Al-IN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW (1989);
HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (1988).
S. See Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21
FAM. L.Q. 417, 467 (1988) [hereinafter Freed & Walker, Family Law Overview 1988] (stating
that the trend with respect to property division "has been to minimize the importance of marital
misconduct as a factor in litigation"). Seventeen states explicitly prohibit consideration of fault
in property distribution decisions, and the Virgin Islands permits it only in awards of the marital
home. Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 24
FAM. L.Q. 309, 343-44 (1991) [hereinafter Freed & Walker, Family Law Overview 1991]; see also
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 307, 9 U.L.A. 238 (1988) [hereinafter UMDA] (requiring
courts to divide marital property at time of divorce "without regard to marital misconduct").
6. See Freed & Walker, Family Law Overview 1988, supra note S, at 472 ("[Alimony a]wards
are increasingly no-fault oriented."). Twenty-eight states and the Virgin Islands explicitly exclude fault as a consideration in alimony determinations. Freed & Walker, Family Law Overview
1991, supra note S, at 3SS-S6. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act does as well. See UMDA
§ 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 348 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Etheridge v. Etheridge, 37S So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1979); Rizzo v. Rizzo, 420 N.E.2d
SSS (Ill. App. 1981); Commonwealth ex rel Myers v. Myers, 360 A.2d S87 (Pa. 1976); see also
UMDA, § 402, 9A U.L.A. S61 (1988) ("The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed
custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.").
8. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 26-28.
9. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Economics ofDivorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results,
in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 7S (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds.,
1990) [hereinafter DIVORCE REFORM].
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isolate changes in legal rules, rather than other social conditions, as
the source of this decline. 1° Finally, some observers argue that women
in fact are not worse off at divorce now than in earlier periods, and
that a focus on fault versus no-fault divorce diverts us from addressing
more fundamental reasons for the often devastating financial effect of
divorce on women. 11
Martha Fineman12 is one who argues that divorce reform has indeed left women more vulnerable after divorce. Specifically, she argues that changes in property distribution rules have left women worse
off financially because they replaced rules that often gave women more
than half of the couple's assets at divorce. Furthermore, she claims
that the movement away from custody rules favoring the mother toward rules favoring joint custody has increased the prospect that
mothers will lose custody of their children and has granted fathers
more bargaining leverage in divorce negotiations.
Fineman finds an ironic culprit responsible for these changes: "liberal legal feminists" (p. 10), who pressed for divorce reforms in the
belief that they would improve the lot of women. The problem,
Fineman maintains, is that the vision of these feminists was flawed
from the outset. Their overriding concern was the achievement of access to the "public" sphere of market work and politics from which
women historically had been excluded. Their battle cry in this endeavor, borrowed from social movements such as the civil rights campaign, was "equality." Women and men are equally capable of
performing the work that men traditionally have dominated, they proclaimed, and therefore should be treated equally. This strategy resulted in several Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s striking down
statutes that violated this principle of equal treatment of men and
women. 13
Fineman argues that these feminists saw women's traditional emphasis on domestic responsibilities as an obstacle to market access, at
odds with the rhetoric of equality of opportunity. As a result, they
sought to formulate a conception of marriage as a partnership of
equals in which men and women make different but comparable contributions. This image enabled feminists to avoid confronting the actual dependence of women within marriage. Acknowledging and
responding to this dependence was seen as perilous, suggests Fineman,
10. See, e.g., Herbert Jacob, Faulting No-Fault, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. R.Es. J. 773.
11. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE
REFORM, supra note 9, at 130, 135.
12. Professor of Law, Columbia University.
13. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that men as well as women must be
eligible for alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (holding that women must receive social security benefits on same basis as men); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (holding that female children of divorced parents are entitled to support for same period of time as
male children).
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because it might "stigmatize or call into question the abilities or commitment of the 'protected' sex on a wider work-related scale" (p. 26;
footnotes omitted). The assertion of the fundamental equality of men
and women within the family thus was seen as an important symbolic
gesture, offering a powerful aspiration that family law was to
reinforce.
This rhetoric of equality and partnership led naturally to rules that
dictated the equal division of marital assets at divorce, even though
women typically are far more financially needy than men at that point.
Furthermore, "[w]omen were no longer to be formally designated and
identified as caretakers of children, a role that would impede equal
market involvement" (p. 29). Equality instead demanded an emphasis
on both parents' child-rearing responsibilities, which led naturally to a
preference for joint custody. Liberal feminists thus were interested in
family law reform "only because the family was viewed as affecting
access to political and economic power" (p. 24). As a result, rather
than face "the difficult problem of what equality should mean in the
family context," they reflexively "for the most part only transposed
feminist market ideology onto the family law area" (p. 25; footnote
omitted). Ignoring a backdrop of gender disparity, they were confident that law's expression of the ideal of equality had the symbolic
power to realign attitudes in accordance with this ideal. Consequently, large numbers of women have suffered economic hardship for
the sake of illusory symbolic benefits.
Professor Fineman's book offers much in the way of trenchant critique and provocative insight. Her analysis of the effect of an equality
standard in property distribution is persuasive and is supported by recent work that indicates that the image of equality exerts a powerful
pull in property decisions, even when it leaves women in need. 14
Fineman also provides a useful analysis of at least part of the politics
underlying a shift in emphasis to joint custody (pp. 79-94). Her account of the role of fathers' rights organizations seems consistent with
the historical evidence, and her examination of the role of the "helping
professions," such as psychology and social work, in influencing our
understanding of divorce demonstrates a keen sensitivity to the power
of language to shape our perception of reality. 15 Her account of the
debates over no-fault divorce in Wisconsin (pp. 53-75) is a fascinating
case study of the ways in which social problems are constructed and
reforms are formulated. Finally, I am deeply sympathetic to
Fineman's suggestion that recent trends in family law too often exalt
self-interested behavior over more cooperative and altruistic conduct.
At the same time, Fineman's emphasis on the unsuitability of
equality rhetoric, and her insistence on the culpability of liberal femi14. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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nists, tends to oversimplify our dilemma, neglecting the complex interaction between divorce and gender. Her argument that feminists were
a powerful influence on the shape of divorce reform, for instance, is
belied by evidence that in most states feminists had little involvement
in the passage of divorce legislation. 16 In addition, to the extent that
feminists participated in debates about property distribution, their focus on equality was not merely symbolic, but was motivated by quite
practical concerns. Furthermore, given the typical paucity of assets
available for distribution at divorce, property rules are unlikely to be
the primary source of any worsening of women's :financial condition at
divorce. Of greater significance has been a lesser willingness to award
alimony, and our inability or unwillingness in the wake of no-fault
divorce to reformulate a theory to justify entitlement to some share of
an ex-spouse's income.
More generally, Fineman's position that law only reflects, and is
generally powerless to provoke, social change embodies a dichotomy
that recent legal and cultural theory has called into question. Her formulation leads her to overlook the ironic possibility that her own proposals, particularly regarding custody, may serve to perpetuate the
very system of gender disadvantage that she decries. Finally, her acceptance of a second rigid dichotomy - between equality and equity
- neglects recent feminist reconceptions of equality that do not rest
on formal equality of identical individuals, but on acknowledgment of
differences between men and women. 17
Central to understanding both the force of Fineman's analysis and
its limitations is an appreciation of the ways in which the gender system tends to disadvantage women economically. Thus, before moving
to a more detailed examination of her argument, I will explore the
connection between gender and economic vulnerability.
II. GENDER AND MONEY

Women and men face substantially different economic prospects
over the course of their lives. The average full-time female worker
earns only seventy-one percent of the wage earned by her male counterpart, 18 and the average college-educated woman earns less than a
typical man with only a high-school diploma. 19 Among white married
couples from ages twenty-five to sixty-four, three of four husbands
earn more than their wives; in half these marriages the wife's wage is
16. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 175-216 and accompanying text.
18. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, l::MPL. & EARNINGS 71 (July
1987).
19. CYNTHIA M. TAEUBER & VICTOR VALDISERA, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT.
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 146,
WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN EcONOMY 31 (1986).

1458

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:1453

less than two thirds that of her husband. 20 When both spouses are the
same age and have the same education, the odds against a wife earning
more than her husband are three to one.
These disparities reflect the fact that women are concentrated in
jobs that offer lower pay, fewer benefits, and fewer opportunities for
advancement than jobs in which men tend to be employed. More than
two thirds of women work in occupations in which seventy percent or
more of the workers are female. 21 Despite centuries of racial discrimination and disadvantage, employment is significantly more segregated
by sex than by race. 22 Furthermore, data on segregation by occupation understate differences, because "even workers employed in apparently sex-neutral occupations often work in industries, firms,
departments, and jobs that are highly segregated by sex."23 This segregation results in substantial wage differences within occupations.
Only one percent of white men and women are employed in jobs in
which women earn as much as ninety percent of men; almost three
fourths are in occupations in which women earn less than seventy percent of what men earn.24
A recent study of the relative economic condition of men and women over the period 1960-1986 concluded that "the gap between women and men in economic well-being was no smaller in 1986 than in
1960."25 The only group for whom matters improved during these
years were young, white, unmarried, well-educated women, most of
whom were childless.26 Despite significant changes in social attitudes
in the past three decades, and notwithstanding the elimination of
much formal sex discrimination in the law, women remain far more
economically vulnerable than men in American society.
20. VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUilSf FOR EcONOMIC EQUALITY 52 (1988).
21. Jerry A. Jacobs, Long-Term Trends in Occupational Segregation by Sex, 95 AM. J. Soc.
160, 160 (1989).
22. The Duncan index indicates the percentage of women who would have to change jobs in
order to eliminate sex differences in the distribution of men and women in different occupations,
and the percentage of blacks who would have to change jobs in order to achieve comparable
racial distributions among occupational categories. In 1980, the index was 57% for women. By
contrast, the figure was 28% for black women versus white women, and 33% for white men
versus black men. FUCHS, supra note 20, at 33-34.
23. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lock of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1751 n.1 (1990); see also SUZANNE M. BIANCHI & DAPHNE SPAIN, AMER·
ICAN WOMEN IN TRANsmoN 165 (1986) ("The workplace is substantially more segregated by
sex than has been shown by studies of occupational concentration•••• [A] great degree of sex
differentiation exists among the specific job titles included in the occupation.").
24. FUCHS, supra note 20, at 51. By contrast, one third of black men are employed in jobs in
which black men earn at least 90% of what white men earn, and two thirds are in occupations in
which their earnings are 80% or more of those of white men. Id.
25. Id. at 3. Economic well-being is defined as "money income plus the imputed value of
goods and services produced within the household plus leisure as measured by time available
after paid and unpaid work." Id.
26. Id.
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Marriage is both a source of these disparities and a buffer against
their full force. On the one hand, marriage perpetrates disadvantage
because most married couples have children, and women still overwhelmingly assume primary responsibility for the care of those children. Victor Fuchs' study of economic inequalities between men and
women concludes that "women's weak.er economic position results
primarily from conflicts between career and family, conflicts that are
stronger for women than for men. " 27 This state of affairs seems to be
the product of a complex interaction between socialization and employment opportunity.
The messages of socialization may be more equivocal for women
than a generation ago, 28 but "[t]he social and psychological importance placed on childbearing remains enormous."29 Kathleen Gerson's study of how women make decisions about family and career, for
in&tance, found that women who opted for childlessness had to confront both social disapproval and personal doubt. They were able to
make their choice only by consciously developing strategies that provided insulation from opprobrium and personal anxiety. 30 Many women believe, even if subconsciously, that a mother who is seriously
committed to her career is shortchanging her child. 31 Mothers who
attempt to combine career and motherhood often find it necessary explicitly to make "a difficult break from past assumptions and parental
messages" that mothers should be home with their children. 32 The
continuing strength of the expectation that women will structure their
lives around primary responsibility for children is reflected in recent
surveys of undergraduates and law students. One study of college students over the past several years revealed that more than sixty percent
of the women but fewer than ten percent of the men said that they
would substantially reduce work hours or quit work altogether if they
had young children. 33 Similarly, a survey of law students indicated
that fifty percent of the women but virtually none of the men said that
they expected to have half or more of the child care responsibility if
27. Id. at 4.
28. See JAMES A. SWEET & LARRY L. BUMPASS, AMERICAN FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS
397 (1989).
29. KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT WORK, CAREER,
AND MOTHERHOOD 153 (1985).
30. Id.
31. Professor Gerson points out, for instance, that both full-time mothers and childless women tend to accept this idea, differing only in the way in which they resolve the perceived conflict. Id. at 184-85, 187. As she observes:
Although their positions were used to justify different actions, childless and domestically
oriented women agreed that career and motherhood are incompatible, that children suffer
when their mothers are strongly committed to the workplace, and that work is an acceptable
option for mothers only as long as it is not defined in terms of career.
Id. at 187.
32. Id. at 177.
33. FUCHS, supra note 20, at 47.
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they had children. 3 4
Professor Gerson's work emphasizes the ways in which these expectations are shaped in the context of the employment opportunities
available for men and women. She found that the decision to have a
child, for instance, was strongly associated with frustration about
prospects at work. 35 Women who are dissatisfied with their work situation are not necessarily prompted to look for a better job or to pursue
more education, because motherhood offers a socially recognized "alternative occupation."36 Furthermore, once they have a child, women
confront a workplace that is structured around the model of "an ideal
worker with no child care responsibilities,"37 which means little flexibility in terms of hours, work location, or time off to attend to domestic needs. Wage differences between men and women provide
additional economic reinforcement for a gendered division of labor,
since the opportunity cost of a father's assuming primary caregiving
responsibility is typically greater than the cost of a mother's doing so.
Even if a woman surmounts all these obstacles to career commitment,
she typically performs disproportionate amounts of housework and
child care when home. 38 As a result, professional women are far more
likely than their male counterparts to leave the work force and to
"specialize in fields [with] the shortest and most predictable work
schedules. "39
The connection between marriage and women's economic disadvantage is succinctly captured in two sets of figures. First, by the time
they are in their forties, married women make only eighty-five percent
as much as unmarried women; by contrast, married men make more
than unmarried men at every age. 40 Second, recent surveys indicate
that only thirty-five percent of women in management positions have
children, compared with ninety-five percent of their male counterparts. 41
At the same time, marriage provides some insulation from the eco34. Project, Law Firms and Lawyers With Children: An Empirical Analysis of the Family/
Work Conflict, 34 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1263, 1281 (1982).
35. See GERSON, supra note 29, at 103-10.
36. Id. at 108.
37. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender. 81 MICH. L. REv. 797, 822 (1989).
38. Arlie Hochschild has calculated that each year women work an entire month more than
men do. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 3 (1989). Another study indicates that in 1983 working wives
worked an average of 144% of what housewives worked, a figure that had increased from 113%
in 1969. Julie A. Heath & David H. Ciscel, Patriarchy, Family Structure and the Exploitation of
Women's Labor. 22 J. EcoN. ISSUES 781, 787 (1988).
39. Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1181-82
(1988).
40. FUCHS, supra note 20, at 59-60.
41. Joan C. Williams, Sameness Feminism and the Work/Family Conflict, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REV. 347, 352 (1990).
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nomic disparities associated with gender. Spouses typically pool resources for use by all members of the household, without imposing
strict eligibility requirements based on market contributions.42 Indeed, the family is often regarded as the paradigm of a social arrangement that allocates resources on the basis of need rather than
entitlement. As a result, a wife need not rely solely on her earning
power in order to obtain material necessities. As Deborah Rhode and
Martha Minow put it: "[M]arriage has presented a promise - between the members of the couple and also between the couple and
society - that the costs of traditional gender roles will not be borne by
women alone but will be spread more broadly throughout society."43
Divorce destroys this buffer against economic vulnerability.
"[T]he matrimonial crisis is a kind of aw~ening from a dream. The
'we' dream is over, the 'yours or mine' reality begins."44 Women and
men must confront life within a market system in which individual
"human capital"45 is a crucial determinant of their standard of living.
At this point, the latent fault line of gender, suppressed and concealed
during marriage, often erupts with a vengeance.
Fineman argues that liberal feminists failed to take into account
this background system of gender in pressing for divorce reforms
based on the principle of equality. As a result, she argues, they were
instrumental in promoting property and custody rules that have had
the effect of worsening the position of women at divorce. The next
two sections examine these claims in more detail.

III. GENDER AND PROPERTY DIVISION
· Fineman first trains her sights on the application of the equality
ideal to the decision about how property should be distributed at the
42. See Susan W. Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
UCLA L. R.Ev. 1, 6 (1977) ("[M]arried people are unlikely to make decisions on an individually
oriented basis; rather the needs of each person tend to be taken into account."); Deborah L.
Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 9, at 191, 193 ("In an ongoing marriage,
the entire family shares in the salary advantages and job-related medical, insurance, and pension
benefits that disproportionately accompany male jobs." (footnote omitted)).
43. Rhode & Minow, supra note 42, at 194 (footnote omitted). This is not to say that economic disparities do not matter within an ongoing marriage. As Susan Moller Okin has observed, "[I]t is still clearly the case that the possession by each spouse of resources valued by the
outside world, especially income and work status, rather than resources valuable primarily within
the family, has a significant effect on the distribution of power in the relationship." SUSAN M.
OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 158 (1989); see also PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER
SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CoUPLES 53-56 (1983) (indicating that economic disparities are associated with differences in power in all intimate relationships except lesbian couples).
44. Orro KAHN-FREUND, MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE 15
(1971).
45. See E. Raedene Combs, The Human Capital Concept as a Basis for Property Settlement at
Divorce: Theory and Implementation, 2 J. DIVORCE 329 (1979); Joan M. Krauskopf, Recom-

pense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human
Capital, 28 KAN. L. R.Ev. 379 (1980).
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time of divorce. Prior to the past two decades, most states divided
property on the basis of title or used presumptions that favored husbands. When that practice came under reconsideration, Fineman argues, there were two conceptual approaches available as alternatives:
need, which examines the economic condition of a dependent spouse,
and contribution, which considers the extent to which a spouse has
assisted in the acquisition of property (p. 51). Each had been used to a
limited degree to offset egregious inequalities that arose under a titlebased rule.
Fineman suggests that because women tend to be more economically needy due to our gendered division of labor, feminists logically
should have urged that need should be the governing principle of
property distribution. The result would be a directive that property be
divided "equitably," which would authorize unequal divisions favoring women. The concept of need, however, has a "negative symbolic
connotation[ ]" that made it unattractive to liberal feminists (p. 42).
These women preferred instead to promote an image of marriage as a
partnership, a model that provided "symbolically compelling presentations of gender equality and independence" (p. 39). The notion of
marriage as a partnership ostensibly promoted greater respect for women's domestic responsibilities than the law earlier exhibited, firmly
asserting that the work women performed at home was just as valuable
as the work men performed outside the home. Such a model emphasized the contributions made by the spouses, rather than their relative
need. It therefore created a natural inclination to divide property
equally because of the spouses' assumed equivalent assistance in acquiring it.
Fineman claims that the equality rule has come to exert a powerful
hold over the legal imagination, a contention that finds some support
in both formal law and informal practice. Two of the eight community property states explicitly require that property be divided
equally, 46 and another has established a presumption in favor of equal
division. 47 In addition, four common law states that mandate equitable division impose a statutory presumption that equal distribution is
equitable,48 and courts in several other common law states have established a preference for equal divisfon. 4 9
46. See CAL. Clv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (West
1991).
47. IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (1983).
48. ARK. CODE§ 9-12-315 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 50-20 (1991); W. VA. CODE§ 48-2-32
(1986); WIS. STAT. § 767.255 (1989).
49. See Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983); Hatch v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1044
(Ariz. 1976); Temple v. Temple, 519 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of
Freese, 226 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1975); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 388 N.W.2d 516 (Neb. 1986); Alpin v.
McAlpin, 532 A.2d 1377 (N.H. 1987); Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293 (Ohio 1981); In re
Marriage of Simmons, 639 P.2d 1296 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1976).
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Even when no presumption of equality has been adopted, and even
when a statute explicitly includes need as a factor to be considered as
part of an equitable distribution, so Fineman maintains that the symbolic and practical appeal of equal division is considerable. Symbolically, the widely influential partnership model of marriage naturally
leads to the assumption that the fairest way to allocate assets is to
divide them equally. As a practical matter, equality offers "easily
grasped contribution factors" that are more accessible to courts than
less clear and less well-developed need factors (p. 49).
One recent survey of judicial property distribution decisions lends
support to Fineman's argument. 51 Suzanne Reynolds examined property allocation data for six equitable distribution states that are among
those that "pa[y] the most statutory attention to need": 52 Arkansas,
Connecticut, Montana, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
Of these, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Wisconsin follow a statutory
presumption of equal division.
Reynolds found that in only a small percentage of cases did courts
specifically focus on need in making their determinations. 53 Unless
the economic disparity between the spouses was "the product of extraordinary circumstances," she observed, "courts appear reluctant to
base an award of greater than half the property or an award of
nonmarital property on need." 54 Even when an unequal division was
based on need, the deviation from equality was slight, typically in the
form of a sixty-forty split. 55 Furthermore, courts basing an unequal
division on need typically offered "no explanation that links addressing need to any theory of equitable distribution. " 56 By contrast,
courts provided extensive discussions of the role of contribution in determining appropriate distributions of property at divorce. 57 Reynolds
concluded that the idea of equal division is extremely influential in
distribution decisions, even in states without a presumption of
equality. 58
In sum, as Steven Sugarman put it, "most people are comfortable
today with the notion that fairness, at least presumptively, suggests an
even split of the divorcing couple's marital property," and "both the
50. As do twenty-eight equitable distribution statutes. See Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship ofProperty Division and Alimony: The /Jivision ofProperty to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 827, 841 (1988).
51. See id. at 844.
52. Id. at 844 n.81.
53. Id. at 852.
54. Id. at 854.
55. Id. at 855.
56. Id. at 857. Montana is an exception. Id. at 888.
57. Id. at 856.
58. She noted that her sample of appealed cases in fact probably overstated the percentage of
cases involving unequal division. Id. at 867 n.170.
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law and practice seem to be moving in that direction." 59 Fineman's
argument that equality has come to dominate property division discourse therefore is persuasive, as is her point that background economic inequalities make equal division problematic for women. Her
account of the emergence of this standard, as well as her assessment of
its significance in producing economic disadvantage, is less persuasive,
however.
First, Fineman's claim that liberal feminists were instrumental in
pressing for an equal distribution standard overstates the involvement
of feminists in the debate over divorce reform. As Herbert Jacob has
indicated, a striking feature of most of the debate over changes in divorce law was the relatively small amount of political conflict over the
reforms. 60 In most states, proposals were presented as narrow technical adjustments to family law, rather than as sweeping efforts to
restructure social relationships. This understanding tended to confine
participation to specialists in family law, with little involvement in
most states by those interested in broader political issues. In retrospect, most conspicuous by their absence were women's groups. "It
may have surprised many readers," Jacob said, "that feminists were
not responsible for the transformation of American divorce law." 61
The evidence indicates that "feminists stood on the sidelines during
most of the activities that led to the adoption of these laws, and the
interests of women in general were poorly represented during their
consideration. " 62
Fineman's characterization of feminists as influential in restructuring property distribution law apparently is based on her experience
with divorce reform in Wisconsin. Her account of the way in which
59. Sugarman, supra note 11, at 148 (footnote omitted); see also STERIN ET AL., supra note 1,
at 113 (noting "close approximation to equality" of property division in dissolution cases in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio); Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction
and Social Change, 1983 WIS. L. REv. 789, 881 (noting that judges and attorneys estimated that
10% or fewer cases deviated from equal property division in Wisconsin).
60. JACOB, supra note 4, at 166-73.
61. Id. at 172.
62. Id.; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 147 (1989) (stating that women's rights groups were not active in divorce reform, nor
were women's interests well-represented); Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault
Divorce Law, 15 CAL. L. REv. 291, 293 (1987) ("[T]he achievement of legal equality between
women and men was not a central goal of the divorce reform effort in California."); Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History ofDivorce Law Reform in New York
State, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 375, 435-36 (1988/1989) (noting that feminists were mostly concerned
with issues other than divorce reform during period of greatest legal change); Rhode & Minow,
supra note 42, at 195 (stating that the "women's rights movement was not significantly involved
with early divorce reforms," primarily because "the implications of such reforms were not yet
apparent").
For a claim that Professor Jacob overlooked the involvement of feminists in the formulation
of the UMDA, see Grace G. Blumberg, Reworking the Past, Imagining the Future: On Jacob's
Silent Revolution, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 115, 130-31 (1991). For Jacob's reply, see Herbert
Jacob, Reply to Blumberg. 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 155, 157 (1991).
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divorce reform proceeded there is an interesting case study of legal
change. It indicates that feminists in Wisconsin indeed saw changes in
property law as an integral element in restructuring the law of divorce,
and that they saw an equality standard as providing the most protection for women (pp. 53-75).
Wisconsin, however, was atypical. Jacob's history of no-fault legislation explicitly stated that Wisconsin was "unlike most states" in
that "no-fault became linked to changes in property division at divorce
through the active intervention of feminist advocates"; 63 thus the debate was highly visible and fraught with political conflict. 64 By contrast, in most states advocates of changes in property law "managed to
channel them in the routine policy-making process."65 While women's groups were often more involved in debates over property law
than in discussion of the grounds for divorce, 66 in most instances property reforms were presented as "narrow, technical proposals by experts in family law."67
To some, then, feminists were guilty of sins of omission, by failing
to give sufficient attention to divorce reform. Fineman's accusation of
sins of commission, however, is wide of the mark. Divorce reforms in
general, and changes in property distribution in particular, by and
large simply were not the product of feminist efforts to impose a vision
of equality.
Second, even when feminists did promote an equal division standard in property law, there were considerable practical, rather than
merely symbolic, concerns that underlay their support. There was
much concern at the time property reforms were being considered that
the broad discretion typically afforded judges tended to lead to allocations that disfavored women. 68 In particular, many feared that the
male-dominated courts would undervalue women's nonmarket domestic contributions to the household. Curbing judicial discretion
through a statutory presumption of equal division was proposed as a
way to "eliminate the gendered, differential evaluation of contributions to a marriage depending on whether work was inside or outside
the home and hence eliminate the possible gender-based disparities in
the distribution of assets."69
These concerns continue to be relevant. One recent study of New
63. Jacob, supra note 1, at 100.
64. Id. at 100-01.
65. Id. at 105.
66. Id. at 122; see also Marcus, supra note 62, at 439-58 (describing split among feminists
over whether equal or equitable distribution rule should be adopted). Women's rights groups in
Pennsylvania successfully lobbied for an equitable distribution standard. See Equal Versus Equitable, 5 EQUITABLE DISrRIBUTION J. 73, 74 (1988).
67. JACOB, supra note 4, at 125.
68. See WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 72; Marcus, supra note 62, at 452.
69. Marcus, supra note 62, at 452.
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York, for instance, an equitable distribution state with no presumption
of equality, suggested that women still tend to receive only about
twenty-five to thirty percent of marital property at divorce, 70 and concluded that "there is little evidence in the reported cases that the
bench is inclined to distribute property equally unless exceptional circumstances are involved. " 71 Furthermore, even Lenore Weitzman,
whose sharp criticism of the effects of a no-fault regime on women has
been the catalyst for much reassessment of divorce reform, has stated
that she favors an equal division rule because of apprehension about
unbounded judicial discretion. 72 Thus, both an equality and an equity
standard present problems, and persons animated by quite pragmatic
considerations may differ on which is preferable. 73
Fineman does acknowledge that liberal feminists had practical
concerns in mind in pressing for equality. 74 Her overwhelming emphasis, however, is on liberal feminists' embrace of the symbolic benefits of equal division. By presenting equality proponents as reformers
who sought to advance ideological objectives at the economic expense
of women, she fails to do justice either to them or to the complexity of
the debate over property distribution standards.
A final problem with Fineman's analysis of property distribution is
that she overemphasizes the importance of property division rules as
the source of the economic disadvantage many women suffer after divorce. Most couples have relatively few assets available for distribution at the time of divorce. Marsha Garrison's recent study of
negotiated divorce settlements in New York state, for instance, found
that the median net worth of couples in contested divorce cases, a
group likely to have more assets than the typical couple, was
$23,591. 75 Furthermore, on average only nineteen percent of the assets of these couples was in liquid form such as bank accounts, stocks,
or bonds. 76 Put differently, the marital estate represented only about
70. Id. at 467 n.342.
71. Id. at 464. One recent study revealed that in 49 of 54 divorce cases women
were relegated to one or a combination of the following ..• : less than a fifty percent overall
share of marital property; short term maintenance after long term marriage; de minimis
shares of business and professional practices which, in addition, the courts undervalued;
terminable and modifiable maintenance in lieu of indefeasible equitable distribution or dis·
tributive awards; and inadequate or no counsel fee awards.
Harriet N. Cohen & Adria S. Hillman, Is ''Equitable Distribution" Fair? The New York Experl·
ence, 4 N.J. FAM. LAW. 85 (1985).
72. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 108.
73. For a thoughtful discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of reliance on rules or
discretion in the child custody context, see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child
Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1991).
74. Pp. 28, 36; see also Martha L. Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce
Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 781, 786 (conceding that concern about judicial discretion is realistic, but concluding that its advantages outweigh its disadvantages).
75. See Garrison,,supra note 1, at 662-63.
76. Id. at 666.
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seven months' income for the median divorcing family. 77 As a result,
Garrison concluded that for typical divorcing spouses, "no property
division rule will make a substantial difference in economic well-being
after divorce. " 78
The primary economic asset of most households is the stream of
future income that represents a return on career investment.79 Men
tend to have better future earnings prospects than women, for the various reasons described earlier. 80 As a result, as Steven Sugarman has
argued, "[I]f women generally are going to fare significantly better in
the couple's division of their :financial interests on divorce, a convincing case is going to have to be made that they are entitled to more of
their former husbands' postdivorce income than they now obtain." 81
At the same time, divorce reform has significantly curtailed the
availability of alimony, or "maintenance," payments, and has emphasized property division as the preferred means to provide for the economic needs of spouses at divorce. 82 That this reorientation is taken
quite seriously is reflected in several studies that have documented significant declines in recent years in both the frequency and amount of
alimony awards. 83 The change in emphasis from alimony to property
thus has blocked access to the marital asset that has the most potential
to redress gendered economic disadvantage. To the extent that this
change has hindered efforts to provide access to postdivorce income, it
is a far more serious source of divorcing women's distress than the
77. Id. at 664.
78. Id. at 730; see also WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 70-109 (describing paucity of assets
available for division at divorce in California).
,79, RHODE, supra note 62, at 150 ("Most couples' assets are primarily intangible, consisting
of professional licenses, insurance, pensions, and related benefits not traditionally subject to marital property division."); WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 110 (noting that the primary wealth of most
divorcing families consists of "tangible and intangible assets that are acquired as a part of either
spouse's career or career potential").
80. See supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
81. Sugarman, supra note 11, at 149; see also RHODE, supra note 62, at 150 (stating that
"distribution of existing assets rather than future income" results in a "rather skewed concept of
equity"); Garrison, supra note 1, at 730 ("It is now time to .•. plac[e] renewed emphasis on
income and its post-divorce distribution.").
82. The UMDA, for instance, illustrates this orientation. UMDA § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 34748 (1988), provides that a court may order alimony only if it finds that the recipient (1) lacks
sufficient property to provide for her needs and (2) is unal;>le to support herself through employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances warrant that the custodian
refrain from working outside the home. The comment to § 308 declares that the purpose of this
section and ofUMDA § 307 (relating to property division) is "to encourage the court to provide
for the financial needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than by an award of maintenance." UMDA § 308 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 348 (1988). While the UMDA has been adopted in only
a few states, "it has been widely influential as a source of ideas and as a model for law revision."
GLENDON, supra note 4, at 227.
83. See, e.g.• FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN IN THE CoURTS 77 (1984); STERIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 125-26; WEITZMAN, supra
note 1, at 163-83; Garrison, supra note 1, at 83-86; McLindon, supra note l, at 360-66.
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adoption of an equal division standard. 84
Fineman mentions this change in allocation policy (pp. 40, 42), but
her overwhelming emphasis on property distribution rules tends to obscure its significance. Moreover, when she does focus on it, she sees it
simply as another instance of the power of equality rhetoric. 85 Certainly a preference for property division over alimony is consistent
with images of equality and economic independence. Alimony historically has reflected an acknowledgement of dependence, 86 while property has powerful cultural appeal as a symbol of autonomy and selfreliance. 87 Those concerned with promoting uotions of equality thus
might well prefer a one-time lump-sum distribution of assets rather
than the perpetuation of contact between an ex-wife and the ex-husband on whom she must rely to make regular alimony payments.
Yet I think that the story cannot be reduced simply to this. The
image of equality is one strand in a more complex fabric of attitudes
and understandings about marriage and its obligations, a fabric whose
patterns have shifted dramatically over the past generation or so. Any
attempt to summarize a zeitgeist risks reductionism. Nonetheless,
with that caveat in mind, one way to characterize the general outline
of this shift is as the continued advance of individualistic tenets that
trace their roots at least as far back as the Enlightenment. 88 In the
current age, these tenets are reflected in heightened awareness of and
attention to the "inner" psychological life of the individual, 89 greater
solicitude for "private" life as a vehicle for personal growth and selfdevelopment, 90 and increasing influence of the view that choice and
consent should be the sources of personal obligation.91 Many persons
now are more apt than a generation ago to see themselves as residents
of what Lawrence Friedman calls "the republic of choice": 92 a society
84. It is true that alimony has been awarded in only a small percentage of cases. See WEITZ·
MAN, supra note l, at 143-45. Prior to recent reforms, however, alimony was a transfer explicitly
guided by the principle of addressing need. To the extent that changes in property distribution
and alimony rules have deemphasized need, there is a weaker conceptual foundation for efforts to
fashion remedies that would draw more extensively on postdivorce income.
85. P. 43; see also Fineman, supra note 74, at 790 (stating that characterization of increased
earning power as property rather than as income available for maintenance is driven by the belief
that "equality [is] the solution" to the economic problems of divorcing women).
86. See Reynolds, supra note SO, at 832 (stating that the traditional "dominant justification"
of alimony is to "accommodate economic need").
87. See JENNIFER NEDEISKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CON·
STITUTIONALISM 272-75 (1990) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Thomas W. Merrill - Ed.).
88. See FRED WEINSTEIN & GERALD PLAIT, THE WISH To BE FREE: SOCIETY, PSYCHE,
AND VALUE CHANGE (1969).
89. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART (1985); PHILIP RIEFF, THE
TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC (1966); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989).
90. See ABRAHAM H. MAsLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1962); CARL R. ROG·
ERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961).
91. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE (1990).
92. Id. at 3.
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committed to "the right to develop oneself, to build up a new life
suited to oneself uniquely, to realize and aggrandize the self, through
free, open selection among forms, models, and ways of living."93
In family life, this is reflected in what has been called the movement "from role to self." 94 In simplified terms, roles prescribe certain
standard reciprocal expectations of behavior among members of a social group. 95 By contrast, greater emphasis on the self envisions more
individual latitude in fashioning one's obligations according to personal preference. Several observers have charted a movement in recent years toward greater attention to individual emotional
satisfaction in family life, and toward an understanding of family relationships as more fluid and open-ended products of negotiation.96 The
result has been a diminishing sense of the family as a set of standard
reciprocal moral relationships and a heightened sense of family life as
an arena of psychological adjustment among unique individuals.
The result in family law has been the decline of what Carl Schneider has called "moral discourse." 97 No-fault divorce, for instance,
proceeds on the assumption that the individuals involved are the only
legitimate judges of whether a marriage should continue; unilateral
no-fault divorce carries the logic of individualism to its conclusion, by
proclaiming that either member of the marriage has the right to disavow the marriage as inimical to his or her personal interest. Similarly,
the elimination of fault in many states as a consideration in economic
and custody decisions at divorce is consistent with the tenet that blame
has no place in analyzing the demise of a marriage, or at least that we
have no consensual moral standards that might guide us in fixing such
responsibility. The standard of psychological health demands that
persons not be constrained by dysfunctional relationships and counsels
that they should be able to move on to a better life without baggage
from the old.
This is of course not all there is to modem family life; we also live
amid competing images of communal devotion and sacrifice. I'm
speaking of relative change in emphasis, not absolute transformation. 98 Furthermore, we have experienced gains from this movement
93. Id. at 2.
94. FRANCESCA M. CANCIAN, LoVE IN AMERICA 30 (1987).
95. See BRUCE J. BIDDLE, ROLE THEORY: EXPECTATIONS, IDENTITIES, AND BEHAVIORS
(1979); ERVING GOFFMAN, Role Distance, in ENCOUNTERS: Two STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF INTERACTION 85 (1961); Jerold Heiss, Social Roles, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 94 (Morris Rosenberg & Ralph H. Turner eds., 1981).
96. See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 89, at 3-26, 70-152; JOHN ScANZONI ET AL., THE SEXUAL BOND: RETHINKING FAMILIES AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 142-88 (1989); JOSEPH VEROFF, ET AL., THE INNER AMERICAN: A SELF-PORTRAIT FROM 1957 TO 1976, at 118, 140-241
(1981); Pepper Schwartz, The Family as a Changed Institution, 8 J. FAM. ISSUES 455 (1987).
97. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transfonnation ofAmerican Family Law,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
98. As family scholar Pepper Schwartz put it:
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toward individualism, particularly with respect to women's position
within the family. One consequence of the gradual displacement of
moral discourse with psychological precepts, however, is greater difficulty in articulating any theory of continuing obligation beyond the
end of a marriage.
This difficulty creates a crisis of legitimacy for alimony.· Alimony
traditionally rested on an analytical foundation of moral reciprocity,
which posited that a woman was entitled to the support of her husband in return for her performance of domestic responsibilities. 99 A
husband deemed at fault in a divorce action for failure to fulfill his
marital duties continued to be subject to his support obligation, for the
law proclaimed that he could not unilaterally evade his responsibility
by breaching the marital contract. Conversely, a wife's fault could
relieve the husband of hls duty of support and preclude receipt of alimony after divorce. We know that alimony actually was awarded in
only a minority of cases, and that dispositions didn't invariably follow
the logic of reciprocal duties. We also know that alimony was closely
associated with gender roles that the law has now repudiated. 100
Nonetheless, a coherent analytical framework served to guide and justify alimony decisions. IOI This framework reflected the notion that
"people who marry take on special responsibilities for each other because of the commitment that defines marriage and because of the
commitments that grow out of a shared life."I 02
In the current age, however, as Professor Fineman observes, "the
existence of a prior marital relationship has come to be considered
insufficient justification for a continuing obligation."I03 The imposition of responsibility on this basis doesn't fit comfortably with heightThis is not to say that there is an absence of generosity or love [among family members]. It
is relative emphasis that is important here, and the point is that the individual will not only
come first, he or she will have a social structure that will allow individual agendas to be
accomplished.
Schwartz, supra note 96, at 458.
99. See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REv. 953, 976-77 (1991).
100. As the Supreme Court declared in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975): "No
longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male
for the marketplace and world of ideas." See also supra note 13 (describing Supreme Court
decisions striking down laws based upon assumption of traditional gender roles).
101. "Alimony awards, indeed divorce awards generally, were financially significant only for
the small percentage of divorcing couples with substantial assets, but the disproportionate atten·
tion given to those cases served to reinforce, at a symbolic level, the importance of marital re·
sponsibilities." Carbone & Brinig, supra note 99, at 978 n.114.
102. Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 257. Judith Areen is more cautious about attributing such a historical
rationale to alimony. She observes that it arose at a time at which divorces were rarely if ever
granted and was adopted in the postdivorce context without any explicit discussion. See JUDITH
AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 592 (2d ed. 1985).
103. P. 40; see also JACOB, supra note 4, at 167 ("[N]ew laws conclude that ex-husbands have
only a transitory responsibility for their former wives' welfare after divorce.").
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ened emphasis on individual choice and freely assumed obligation. As
a r~ult, we are struggling mightily to formulate an ethic of
postdivorce responsibility that seems more consistent with contemporary solicitude for self-development and with greater suspicion of the
past as a constraint on personal growth. 104 In the face of this difficulty, the image of a "clean break" between divorcing spouses gains
considerable appeal. 105 Lump-sum property division with minimal alimony is the natural expression of this philosophy. For persons disengaging from a relationship of mutual dependence, it offers a stock of
capital to each that will permit "[t]he construction of a new life
through the market." 106 With forty acres and a mule, the individual
can strike out on her own toward the promised land of autonomy.
Thus, precisely when the most important marital assets are more
difficult to conceptualize as property, and when a claim on future income is increasingly important, we seem less and less able to offer a
theory of postdivorce obligation. It is not merely, as Fineman argues,
that we are unwilling to acknowledge need. It is that we seem to be
less willing to conclude that a former spouse should be the one to meet
that need. Furthermore, this is not the result simply of equality rhetoric, but of a complex dialectic between individualism and equality.
Greater emphasis on the individual as a sovereign apart from social
relationships leads naturally to the embrace of formal equality, which
posits the abstract similarity of all individuals. In turn, this formulation reinforces our understanding of persons as fundamentally asocial
entities, for whom nonconsensual obligation based on the mere fact of
a prior relationship seems unfair.
Professor Fineman's relentless criticism of equality thus leads her
to focus excessively on property distribution rules, and by and large to
neglect both the importance and complex roots of a declining willingness to impose alimony. Her analysis of changes in economic ordering
at divorce thus ultimately offers a critique of only a small part of the
picture, which does not grapple with the more complicated texture of
divorce reform and economic disadvantage. What kinds of theories of
postdivorce obligation can we formulate in a postfault world? Should
104. For one attempt to formulate a basis for postdivorce assistance, see Ira M. Ellman, The
Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989). For critiques of Ellman, see June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv.
1463 (1990); Schneider, supra note 102. Ellman's reply to Schneider is contained in Ira M. Ellman, Should the Theory ofAlimony Include Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations?, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 259. For other discussions of possible analytical models for alimony, see Carbone &
Brinig, supra note 99; Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a
Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 437 (1988); June Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income As
a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 539 (1990); Sugarman, supra note 11.
105. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 62, at 313 (characterization of future earning capacity as
property "is inconsistent with the no-fault philosophy that seeks to achieve a clean break between
spouses to enable each to begin a new life").
106. Marcus, supra note 62, at 457.
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we reject the dichotomy between property and alimony in favor of an
approach that draws on characteristics of each? Even if we can construct them, do we have any reason to believe that we can enforce such
obligations, given our dismal experience with delinquent child support
payments? 107 Are the economic benefits of alimony outweighed by the
perpetuation of a woman's dependence on her ex-husband? Should
there be greater public sector involvement in addressing the financial
distress divorce often creates? If so, will that weaken even further
men's sense of continuing responsibility? We must confront a host of
questions such as these, and Fineman elsewhere has shown her sensitivity to some of them. 108 In this book, however, the insight she offers
is limited by an overly narrow focus on an equality rule in property
division.
IV.

GENDER AND CUSTODY

Fineman argues that equality rhetoric also appears in child custody law, in the form of greater legal support for joint custody. In
1975, only one state had any statutory provision for joint custody;
more than half the states now have such a law. 109 Furthermore,
courts in some states without a joint custody statute have established
such an arrangement through common law adjudication. 110 Many
states permit a court to impose a joint custody arrangement over the
objection of one of the parents, 111 and some states have established a
presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the child. 112
These developments, Fineman argues, represent the principle of
"equal division" as applied to the issue of custody (p. 163).
The custody law that immediately preceded recent divorce reforms
by and large benefited women. First, it considered marital fault in
determining which parent should be awarded custody, a practice that
usually favored mothers. Second, the law generally presumed that
mothers should be awarded custody of at least those children of
107. See GLENDON, supra note 4, at 232; Nan D. Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy:
The Systematic Imposition of Costs on Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1983).
108. See Fineman, supra note 74.
109. See Appendix A: Joint Custody Statutes and Judicial Interpretations, in JOINT CUSTODY
AND SHARED PARENTING 297-331 (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter Joint Custody
Appendix].
110. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1981).
111. Joint Custody Appendix, supra note 109, at 297-331.
112. Id. Joint custody actually can involve either joint physical or joint legal custody. Under
a joint physical custody arrangement, the child spends a roughly equivalent amount of time
residing with each parent. With joint legal custody, the parents are accorded the right to participate equally in major decisions affecting the child, such as choice of religion, choice of school, or
significant medical care. Fineman does not distinguish between the two in her discussion. Her
emphasis on the possibility that women's ties with their children might be severed seems to
imply, however, that her focus is primarily on joint physical custody.

May 1992]

Divorce Reform

1473

"tender years." 113 The first blow to this system occurred when many
states eliminated fault as a consideration in custody proceedings. The
second occurred, Fineman argues, when liberal feminists insisted on
the adoption of gender-neutral rules in family law as a "symbolic imperative" (p. 80).
Fineman maintains that these developments paved the way for fathers' rights groups to draw on feminist equality rhetoric in pressing
for joint custody as a matter of equal rights for men (pp. 81, 87-89).
These groups claimed that mothers had no distinctive parental competence superior to that of fathers, a position that was seen as consistent
with liberal feminist rejection of gender stereotypes (pp. 88-89). Men's
groups asserted the unfairness of a system that they claimed "always
gave mothers custody and treated [men] as nothing more than 'walking wallets' " (p. 88).
Men were assisted in their campaign by members of the "helping
professions" - psychologists, social workers, and others who provide
emotional counseling. With the loss of relatively predictable rules or
presumptions, courts were confronted with the need to decide each
case on the basis of the open-ended standard of the "best interests of
the child." Counseling professionals moved in to fill this vacuum,
Fineman says, by promoting their expertise in assessing the likely psychological consequences of different custody arrangements in individual cases. They offered social science research as a source of guidance
to courts otherwise adrift in a highly subjective and speculative exercise. Furthermore, Fineman argues, they relied upon therapeutic rhetoric to push for moving the custody determination out of the
adversarial court system and into the ostensibly more conciliatory
realm of mediation (pp. 144-69). As experts in counseling, they were
the logical parties to supervise this process and to provide recommendations to the court as to which custody arrangement was
preferable. 114
Fineman observes that these procedural reforms contained a substantive component: the model of shared postdivorce parenting as the
ideal form of custody. This model emphasizes the importance of the
continued involvement of both parents in the child's life, regardless of
the level of past participation in child rearing. This model is based in
part on social science research emphasizing the significance and distinctiveness of fathers' contributions. From this perspective, requests
for sole custody are suspect. They are likely to be seen as the product
of the unresolved hostility of one parent toward the other, rather than
113. The age varied, but generally was up to ten or eleven years old. Jamil S. Zainaldin, The
Emergence of a Modem American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Court, 17961851, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038, 1085 (1979).
114. For example, see the California divorce mediation process described in Robert H.
Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial A"angements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 9, at 37, 41.
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sentiment based on concern for the child's best interest. Thus,
Fineman concludes, liberal feminists, fathers' rights groups, and psychological professionals all have combined to press successfully for an
increased legal preference for joint custody (pp. 79-143).
Fineman argues that joint custody awards in cases in which neither
parent genuinely favors it has created serious problems for women.
Joint custody has "profoundly affect[ed] bargaining power between
spouses at divorce" (p. 150), because men now plausibly can threaten
a custody challenge and extract economic concessions in return for
withdrawing it. Furthermore, women who have devoted themselves to
childrearing now are more vulnerable to disruption of the bond with
their children. Mothers typically see joint custody as a loss, while fathers see it as a victory (p. 164), and today, Fineman argues, "a man
who pursues a custody case has a better than equal chance of gaining
custody" (p. 90).
The continuous contact between parents that is necessary under
joint custody also may cause problems by prolonging and exacerbating
conflict, resulting in emotional stress for both parents and children.
Accordingly, Fineman argues, it may increase an ex-husband's control
over his ex-wife and children (p. 164). Moreover, granting a father
joint legal custody while the mother retains physical custody can give
a father rights without any commensurate day-to-day responsibilities.
Joint custody also invites greater ongoing state supervision over the
postdivorce family unit, because of the enhanced possibility of childrearing conflicts between mothers and fathers. Finally, Fineman argues, joint custody devalues the disproportionate amount of caretaking that mothers typically provide, proclaiming instead that the
father's mere tie of biology should give rise to equal parental rights.
Fineman devotes considerable space to demonstrating that the
studies on father custody that have served as the empirical underpinning for joint custody are much less conclusive than proponents contend (pp. 127-43). Given this, and given the myriad ways in which
she believes joint custody laws disadvantage women, Fineman suggests
that courts should adopt a presumption that custody should be
awarded to the parent who has been the primary caretaker of the child
during the marriage. 11s This rule is formally gender-neutral but
would reward the nurturing behavior that mothers normally provide
under the current gendered division of labor system. Furthermore, it
would emphasize factfinding about past behavior, rather than speculation about future behavior, and thus would require "an inquiry traditionally performed by courts" (p. 182).
Fineman's critique of joint custody echoes that of several other
115. P. 181; see, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W.Va. 1981); see also Richard
Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE
L. & POLY. REv. 168 (1984).
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critics who have characterized this development as detrimental to women.116 In addition, her description of the influence of fathers' rights
organizations in pushing for joint custody appears supported by the
historical evidence. 117 Her account of the movement for joint custody
evinces a sensitive and perceptive awareness of the ways in which rhetoric helps constitute our social world, shaping our understanding of
both our situation and the possibilities for responding to it. Her close
analysis of the literature on father custody underscores the perils of
uncritical acceptance of social science research and the importance of
eschewing broad pronouncements in favor of attention to nuance and
context. Fineman thus undermines any lingering notion that joint custody is an unqualified good, a happy solution to the conflict that often
attends the issue of child custody.
Yet Fineman herself succumbs to the impulse toward absolutism
in her categorical denouncement of joint custody. While literature on
the effects of various custody arrangements is still in an early stage,
research suggests that joint custody may work well or ill depending on
a variety of factors that characterize different situations. 118 This literature has explored the effect of joint custody on matters such as parental hostility, payment of child support, visitation, the well-being of
children, and continued litigation under a variety of conditions. At a
minimum, it indicates that we should neither accept nor reject joint
custody uncritically, but must be cognizant of particularities in assessing its propriety in various situations. The dangers of categorical
think.mg are also articulated by Katharine Bartlett and Carol Stack,
who caution that statements about the effect of joint custody on women as a group ignore racial and socioeconomic differences among
women that affect the way custody arrangements are perceived and
experienced. 119 Given Professor Fineman's emphasis on the empirical
effects oflaw and her subtle analys_is of the research on father custody,
116. See Ramsey L. Klaff, The Tender Year.s Doctrine: A Defense, 10 CAL. L. REv. 335
(1982); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mother.s Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235 (1982); Jana B. Singer & William L.
Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REv. 497 (1988); Rena K. Uviller, Father.s'
Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1978).
117. See JACOB, supra note 4, at 137-38.
118. See, e.g., DEBORAH A. LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY (1982); Alice Abarbanel, Shared
Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study ofJoint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
320 (1979); W. Glenn Clingempeel & N. Dickon Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce: Major
Issues and Goals for Research, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 102 (1982); Susan Steinman, Joint Custody:
What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 739 (1983); Susan B. Steinman et al., A Study of Parents Who Sought Joint
Custody Following Divorce: Who Reaches Agreement and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns to Court, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 554 (1985). For an examination of the
limitations of many of the joint custody studies that have been <!one thus far, see Elizabeth Scott
& Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L:J. 455, 484-95 (1984).
119. Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism, and the Dependency
Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986).
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it is puzzling that she is not more grounded and discriminating in her
assessment of joint custody.
One study Fineman may not have had the opportunity to consult
before publication - that conducted by Mnookin, Macoby, Albiston,
and Depner - is perhaps the most comprehensive study of custody to
date. Its authors conclude that their study "contradict[s] the claims of
those who suggest that mothers are losing custody in a high proportion of cases." 120 Nearly eighty percent of physical custody cases involved no conflict between mothers and fathers. Mothers' requests for
custody were submitted more than ten times as often in these cases as
fathers' requests, and the mother received sole custody in 90% of these
cases. 121 In cases of conflict, mothers' requests were granted twice as
often as fathers'. 122 When each parent sought sole physical custody,
women won 46% of the cases and men 9.6%.123
In the county for which historical data were available, the study
found that joint legal custody had increased from 25% in 1979 to 79%
in 1985-1988. 124 Because mothers are awarded sole physical custody
in a large percentage of cases and have de facto physical custody even
in many instances of joint custody or father custody, however, the authors question the practical significance of this shift. 125 The study did
not attempt to determine the extent to which custody challenges might
be used as economic bargaining ploys, but some evidence at least suggests that they were not. Less than 9% of the fathers asked for more
custody than they actually desired, 126 and nearly 35% of the fathers
asked for less custody than they really wanted. 127 In addition, the
award of joint legal custody was not significantly related to the
amount of the child support granted, which suggests that "custodial
mothers did not substantially compromise on child support to keep
sole legal custody." 128 Some of the dire predictions about joint custody thus may be unfounded.
Furthermore, an article presenting data from the same study indicates that joint legal custody was not strongly associated with greater
120. Mnookin et al., supra note 114, at 71.
121. Id. at 52.
122. Id. at 53.
123. Id. at 54. The remainder of the cases were resolved by awarding joint custody.
124. Id. at 59. Joint physical custody in both counties under study was awarded about in
about 20% of the cases. Id. at 67.
125. Some 39.6% of formal joint physical custody arrangements were de facto mother custody, as were 23% of formal father custody arrangements. Id. at 67.
126. Id. at 49. Some 5.1% of the women did the same. Id.
127. Id. at 49. Only 12.2% of the mothers did the same. Id.
128. Catherine R. Albiston et al., Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POLY.
REv. 167, 176 (1990). It is reasonable to believe, however, that concern over retaining sole
physical custody might create more incentive to make economic concessions, particularly if the
authors are correct that joint legal custody is seen as no significant threat to a mother's everyday
control over the child.
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contact between fathers and their children, 129 with more involvement
in either everyday or major decisions about the child, 130 with greater
compliance with child support orders once income was accounted
for, 131 or with payment for extra items for the child. 132 Overall,
"though policies concerning standards for custody decisions may be
gender-neutral, social realities still produce gender differentiation between parents." 133 Thus, some of the aspirations of joint custody proponents also appear to be unfulfilled. Joint custody seems to be
neither as bad nor as good as its opponents and supporters respectively
claim.
Fineman might well argue that this research supports her view that
the primary caretaker presumption is preferable because joint custody
creates more potential for bargaining abuse and maternal disruption
without providing any concomitant benefits. This seems plausible
enough. 134 Yet Fineman fails to confront a powerful argument against
the primary caretaker presumption: that it perpetuates gendered patterns of childrearing. Fineman acknowledges that the presumption
will tend to result in more mothers than fathers obtaining custody, but
says that she "refus[es] to accept ... that there is a problem, legal or
social, with the fact that mothers continue to receive custody of their
children in large numbers" (p. 118). Rather, she argues, "if we value
nurturing behavior, then rewarding those who nurture seems only
fair" (p. 183).
Fineman's argument has considerable appeal. Her apparent lack
of concern about the disparate gender impact of the presumption,
however, stems from what is probably the most serious problem in her
book: her cramped view of law as the mere reflection of social attitudes. On her view, it is simply misguided to look to law to help
reshape relations between men and women. To worry about the
"message" that law may be sending, she maintains, is to pursue the
chimerical "symbolic" benefits that have led so many feminists astray.
It is worth exploring this position in more detail, because it shows how
129. Id. at 172-73.
130. Id. at 173-74.
131. Id. at 176.
132. Id.
133. Mnookin et al., supra note 114, at 74.
134. A study of Minnesota's experience with the primary caretaker presumption, however,
injects a note of caution. The study found that adoption of the presumption "caused an explosion of litigation," primarily over the issue of which parent was the primary caretaker. Gary
Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody StandardSetting in the Wake ofMinnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference,
75 MINN. L. R.Ev. 427, 452 (1990). The uncertainty resulting from increased litigation suggests
that the presumption may create the opportunities for bargaining abuse for which Fineman condemns the joint custody preference. The Minnesota legislature ultimately rejected the presumption, requiring courts to consider multiple factors under the best interests standard. Id. at 42829.
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Fineman's analysis of both the economic and custody aspects of divorce is vulnerable to the very charge that she levies against liberal
feminists - namely, that they fail to take into account the background
system of gender in which we all live.
V.

LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND CULTURAL MEANING

Professor Fineman is emphatic in declaring that her analysis "assumes the relative powerlessness of law to transform society as compared to other ideological institutions of social constitution within our
culture" (p. 10). The mistake of the liberal feminists, she argues, was
their assumption that law could be used as "the instrument of social
change" (p. 10). A more realistic assessment, she maintains, is that
law is "more a mirror than a catalyst" (p. 11), which can "seldom if
ever be used to initiate" social change. 135 Family law should be based
not on "grand theoretical abstractions," but on the actual circumstances of women and children (p. 11).
Fineman thus sees the options for conceptualizing law as binary:
law is either an independent or dependent variable, either a cause or
effect of social attitudes. Since she sees law as primarily passive reflection, she argues that it should simply address those in need, without
attending to unfounded concerns about the broader message that law
may be sending. Fineman regards her approach as a hardheaded,
pragmatic focus on the "real" material world that people occupy, a
world in which law is simply the vehicle for effectuating the desires
that arise independently of the legal universe.
It is surely wise to harbor some skepticism about claims that law
can transform social attitudes. There may be particular temptation for
lawyers and legal academics to overemphasize the changes that law
can produce, and to underemphasize the stubborn persistence of habits
of mind that have been forged in the context of daily existence. Too
many of us are acutely aware of the gap between the law on the books
and the law as lived to be overly sanguine that the formal proclamation of ideals will necessarily cause a realignment of beliefs and behavior. Furthermore, undue attention to law as a vehicle for social
change may deflect energy away from more broadly based political
efforts that have greater promise for changing consciousness in a more
enduring fashion.136
Caution and healthy skepticism need not lead, however, to categorical rejection of law as an influence in the formation of attitudes.
135. P. 10; see also pp. 10-11 ("No matter what the formal legal articulation, the implementation of legal rules will track and reflect the dominant conceptualization and conclusions of the
majority culture.").
136. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Stephen L. Carter. - Ed.); Girardeau
A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990).
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The assumption that law is merely effect is as simplistic as the assumption that it is simply cause; neither position does justice to the complex
relationship among law, behavior, and culture. Fineman's categorical
embrace of one polar position leaves her open to criticism that she
ignores at least two more sophisticated conceptions of law, each of
which can be used to argue that her ·approach to the economic and
custody consequences of divorce may perpetuate a gender system that
will continue to disadvantage women. These criticisms are not necessarily conclusive. Fineman's failure to confront them, however, detracts from the force of her argument and reflects a missed
opportunity to make a richer and more subtle contribution to the debate about divorce reform.
The first conception is of law as the provision of a set of incentives,
which affects the costs and benefits of various alternative courses of
action. 137 From this perspective, a divorce regime that allocates children and a greater share of economic assets to the person who assumed more domestic responsibility during the marriage lowers the
costs associated with forgoing employment opportunities outside the
home. To the extent that we compensate a spouse at divorce for these
forgone opportunities, we eliminate at least any economic disincentives to concentrate on the domestic rather than the market sphere.
Observers who believe that we should encourage selfless behavior that
furthers shared spousal interests acknowledge this connection between
incentives and behavior, and argue that the failure adequately to compensate the spouse who devotes herself to household needs will ultimately reduce the willingness to engage in unselfish behavior. 138
A commitment to rewarding the assumption of domestic responsibility can be couched in gender-neutral terms, so that either husband
or wife is the potential beneficiary. The existing gender system, however, makes it much more likely that women rather than men will find
their cost-benefit calculus affected by such measures. We know that
women generally earn less income than men, and that their career opportunities tend to be more circumscribed than those of their male
counterparts. 139 The costs of forgoing market activity are thus lower
for women than for men. We also know that socialization140 often
results in women's higher valuation of the benefits available from child
137. See Sugarman, supra note 11, at 141-42 (stating that one way to see divorce law is as set
of behavioral incentives). Perhaps the most prominent example of this orientation is law and
economics. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS
(1983); RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
138. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 62, at 154 ("Ifwe wish to encourage sharing relationships,
we cannot continue to penalize sharing behavior."); Prager, supra note 42, at 12 (noting that
marital property law's failure to reflect sharing principles may discourage cooperative behavior).
139. See supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
140. And perhaps biology, though that is a more controversial proposition. See generally
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990).
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rearing. An increase in the benefits available from domestic specialization, or, put differently, a decrease in the costs, thus is likely to make
the domestic option attractive to many more women than men. 141 As
a result, short-term measures intended to address women's dependency may encourage a pattern of choices that perpetuates that dependency in the long run, preventing many women from becoming selfsupporting economic actors.
This potential for reinforcement of the gender system is underscored by the fact that economists who see efficiency gains from the
traditional division of labor within the household advocate generous
economic compensation for women at the time of divorce. 142 These
analysts deem such compensation necessary in order to induce women
to invest in household as opposed to market skills in the face of uncertainties about the length of the marriage. Without a transfer of assets
at divorce, Elizabeth Landes has argued, "the wife's desired level of
home production would fall substantially short" of the optimum. 143
An efficient level of alimony thus will "encourage efficient resource
allocation within marriage" 144 to the extent that it "approximate[s]
the value of the wife's forgone opportunities from entering the
marriage." 145
The dilemma posed by a desire both to help those in need and to
avoid the creation of incentives that reinforce women's dependence is
reflected in the work of Professor Herma Hill Kay. On the one hand,
Professor Kay favors adequate compensation for at least some wives
who have sacrificed career opportunities for homemaking responsibilities.146 On the other hand, she argues that we should "withdraw existing legal supports" for the "division of function by sex within
marriage." 147 This is necessary, she maintains, because women's position will never improve as long as they continue to "make choices that
will be economically disabling." 148 As June Carbone and Margaret
Brinig have pointed out, the logical conclusion of Kay's second sug141. See RHODE, supra note 62, at 165 (noting that women who make investments in human
capital still progress more slowly than men, which makes concentration on household responsibilities more appealing than it is to men).
142. GARY s. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-37 (1981); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,
Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, ''I Gave Him the Best Years ofMy Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267
(1987); Elizabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978).
143. Landes, supra note 142, at 46. This is because the wife has a greater proportion of
investment in activities that are "marital specific," such as "child care and development, meal
preparation, home repair, and activities that contribute generally to the health and welfare of the
family" that would be "less valuable if the marriage were to dissolve." Id. at 40.
144. Id. at 58.
145. Id. at 49.
146. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Dfrorce and Its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN: L. REv. 1, 79-80 (1987).
147. Id. at 85.
148. Id. at 80.
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gestion is that we should provide women with "less, not more, financial support upon divorce."149 Kay's difficulty in reconciling her two
positions reflects how complicated our assessment of the best course of
action becomes when we acknowledge that law may produce incentives for certain types of behavior. With respect to divorce law, this
perspective requires that we at least confront the possibility that shortterm attention to need may reinforce choices that perpetuate longterm dependency.
Even if we are skeptical about family law's capacity to provide incentives to which persons respond, a second conceptualization of law
might also serve as the basis for a critique of Fineman's analysis. This
is the view that law plays a part in creating cultural meaning - those
understandings of self, others, and the world at large that make it possible for people "to imagine principled lives they can practicably
lead."150
This perspective rejects the idea that law is either (or even primarily) cause or effect. Rather, it is both: an active element in the shaping
of culture that at the same time cannot help but be influenced by that
culture. Law is one way among many that a culture attempts to impose a meaningful order upon events. 151 As self-interpreting beings,
we live by narratives that purport to bestow coherence upon the tangled and fragmented world of sense impressions. Law is one source of
narrative, a cultural practice that "gives us our terms for constructing
a social universe by defining roles and actors and by establishing expectations as to the propriety of speech and conduct." 152 Locating
ourselves within this universe, we can see ourselves as participants in
an ongoing story, in which some things are worthy of praise and
others of blame, and in which we can imaginatively expand our sense
of self both backward into history and forward into the future.
This focus on structures of meaning finds problematic the assumption of a disjunction between the material and symbolic world.
Rather, material circumstances give rise to certain forms of symbolic
action, which in turn provide particular interpretations of material
149. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 99, at 994.
150. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LoCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FuRTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 234 (1983); see, e.g., MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985) [hereinafter HERACLES' Bow]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING (1984); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Bartlett & Stack, supra note 119.
A sympathetic but cautionary note is sounded in Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of
Family Law, 22
DAVIS L. REV. 991 (1989).
151. "What Frank O'Hara said of poetry, that it makes life's nebulous events tangible and
restores their detail, may be true as well, and no less variously accomplished, oflaw." GEERTZ,
supra note 150, at 182.
152. JAMES BOYD WHITE, Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in
HERACLES' Bow, supra note 150, at 29, 36; see also Bartlett & Stack, supra note 119, at 28
(stating that, to the extent that law influences ideology, it affects how persons interpret events).

u.c.

1482

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:1453

life. Linguistic scholars, for instance, have suggested how our physical
embodiment gives rise to certain cognitive models, which we then project onto new and more abstract situations through the use of metaphor.153 The symbolic deployment of metaphor is thus central to our
functioning within the world, an exercise that is rooted in material
circumstances even as it offers interpretive models for making sense of
those circumstances.
Fineman therefore is simplistic when she claims that what distinguishes her analysis is her "belief in the desirability of basing law on
what is concrete rather than what is abstract" (p. 7). This assertion
suggests a dichotomy between material and symbolic realms and
seems to posit some basic sphere of "real life" unmediated by interpretive abstractions. Yet symbolic self-understandings, aspirations, and
images of conduct are as "real" as anything else, because they are woven into the fabric of meaningful everyday experience. The assumption that law is properly associated only with a self-contained material
world fails to recognize that law consists of a stock of symbols that
represent "a distinctive manner of imagining the real."154
This integration of the material and the symbolic is particularly
apparent in family life. It is within the family that we come to full
consciousness as distinct human beings in a world of other beings; we
first encounter joy, rage, love, jealousy, anger, altruism, and a host of
other emotions in our interaction with other family members. These
experiences serve powerfully to inform our understanding of more abstract basic moral concepts, which in tum provide cues about the propriety of specific behavior and expressions of emotion in particular
instances. 155 Family life, then, is the realm in which we first experi~
ence the imposition of narrative coherence upon primal sensation. Put
differently, it is where we hear our first stories about what it means to
be human. Not surprisingly, then, as Fineman herself acknowledges,
153. See MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING,
IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). In a series of insightful articles, Steven Winter has
explored the implications of this understanding for legal theory. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, B11/l
Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy
and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990); Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988);
Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for
Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Death is the Mother of Metaphor, 105
HARV. L. REv. 745 (1991) (book review).
154. GEERTZ, supra note 150, at 184.
155. See JAMES R. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN EssAY ON EMOTION (1982);
James R. Averill, The Social Construction of Emotion: With Special Reference to Love, in THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PERSON 89 (Kenneth J. Gergen & Keith E. Davis eds., 1985).
See generally the essays contained in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS (Rom Harre
ed., 1986).

May 1992]

Divorce Reform

1483

discourse about the family is "highly emotionally charged and fraught
with symbolism" (p. 17).
Family law is one source of narrative about what it means to inhabit this world of the family. It offers certain models and aspirations
that are intended to guide behavior, perhaps less by manipulating the
calculus of costs and benefits than by promoting the adoption of particular self-understandings. People draw a sense of what it means to
be a husband, wife, or parent in part from the expectations expressed
in law, even if they do not respond directly to the existence of a given
rule. People who inhabit worlds in which spouses must prove fault to
the satisfaction of the state in order to divorce, or in which minors
must obtain parental consent to obtain an abortion, or in which the
state equalizes the standard of living of divorcing spouses, do not just
live in different material worlds from people who are subject to different legal rules. To some degree, they also inhabit different conceptual
worlds, defined by distinct sets of norms and values on which people
rely in assessing different courses of action.
Several recent scholars have emphasized that divorce law shapes
the expectations that persons bring to marriage, because the enforcement of some obligations and not others necessarily provides an indication of what it means for two persons to be married to one
another. 156 Lenore Weitzman, for example, has expressed concern
that a decline in financial assistance for dependent spouses at divorce
not only has visited economic hardship, but "has altered the obligations of the marriage contract, and, as a result, is creating new norms
and new expectations for marriage and family commitments in our
society."1 51 Professor Fineman acknowledges that "divorce rules
symbolically reflect more than what is considered to be appropriate
legal policy," and that they "also stand as eloquent statements about
society's views on the nature of family and marriage" (p. 12). She
does not, however, see those statements as having any effect on selfunderstanding. Rather, for Fineman the causal arrow seems to run in
only one direction; law is simply the empty vessel into which we pour
our social attitudes.
Fineman's narrow view of the relationship between law and culture leaves her vulnerable to charges that her proposals might send a
message that current gender arrangements are desirable and inevita156. See KEVIN J. GRAY, REALLOCATION OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE 1 (1977) (stating that
the law of property division at divorce "affords a peculiar wealth of commentary on such matters
as the prevailing ideology of marriage, the cultural definition of the marital roles, the social status
of the married woman and the role of the state vis-d-vis the family"); RHODE, supra note 62, at
149 ("Policies concerning marital dissolution have always given important signals about gender
roles and cultural priorities.").
157. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at xv; see also Reynolds, supra note 50, at 904 (noting that
judicial decisions regarding property division "appear[] to have concluded that the availability of
no-fault divorce has redefined marriage so that spouses no longer assume that they may have
commitments to the other that survive divorce").
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ble. Specifically, given the backdrop of the existing gender system,
divorce law that treats economic transfers and custody as a "reward"
for concentrating on household tasks may reinforce the message that
domesticity is a viable alternate career for women. Internalization of
this understanding by both men and women would perpetuate the
traditional division of labor, prompting a wife to forgo career investment even though "[e]mployment is likely to make women more economically self-sufficient, at least in the long run."158
Rejection of joint custody in favor of the primary caretaker has
met with particularly pointed criticism on this ground. Katharine
Bartlett and Carol Stack have maintained that "[t]he feminist critique
of joint custody recognizes 'reality,' but only part of it, and perpetuates antiegalitarian norms that contribute to the continuation of this
reality." 159 They have cautioned that greater assurance that women
will gain custody may provide short-term benefits, but at the cost of
furthering stereotypes that "women usually will (read, should) take
primary responsibility for the caretaking of children." 160 While the
primary caretaker presumption is formally gender neutral, "it leaves
untouched a non-neutral and discriminatory reality" in which women
remain economically dependent because of their concentration on
child rearing. 161 Favoring the primary caretaker thus takes the status
quo as given, an approach dictated by the assumption that law is powerless to change social attitudes.162
According to Bartlett and Stack, by contrast, joint custody offers
an alternative vision of parental responsibilities, which assumes that
"both parents should, and will, take important roles in the care and
nurturing of their children." 163 They argue that custody law shouldn't
be used to reward parents who "earn" the "right" to custody, because
that orientation fosters an understanding of parental responsibilities as
contingent. 164 Rather, law should express the ideal that nurturing
children is a moral imperative incumbent on both parents, which cannot be disavowed. By holding up this vision of parenthood, joint custody may be able in subtle ways to reshape attitudes about
responsibility for children. Its expression ~f what it means to be a
parent becomes part of the stock of narratives by which individuals
make sense of their lives and their relations with others.
If, then, we focus on law as an element in the creation of cultural
158. Bartlett & Stack, supra note 119, at 18.
159. Id. at 40.
160. Id. at 32.
161. Id.
162. "Neutrality in this context is a facade, describing how things are regardless of what
better state of affairs one might imagine." Id.
163. Id. at 33.
164. Id. at 33-34.
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meaning, we might prefer joint custody to the primary caretaker presumption even if research indicates that recent legal change appears
not to affect current patterns of childrearing. The study discussed earlier, which concluded that joint custody is neither as good nor as bad
as partisans contend, 165 underscores this point. As researchers in that
study suggest, "[p]erhaps the importance of joint legal custody is that
it is a legislative affirmation that fathers, as well as mothers, are responsible for their children after divorce." 166 The impact of joint custody therefore "may best be measured not by comparing sole and joint
legal custody families of the same temporal cohort, but by comparing
successive cohorts on parental behavior following divorce." 167 Attitudinal change often occurs slowly and gradually over time, as persons
assimilate various cultural cues about appropriate behavior. Regulation premised on the assumption that law plays no part in this process
may forgo the opportunity to transform, and may in fact promote,
underlying patterns of behavior that sustain inequitable
arrangements. 168
These objections to Fineman's analysis are not necessarily conclusive. Her failure to confront them, however, undermines the force of
her argument and deprives us of the opportunity to engage in a richer
and more complex debate about the direction of divorce law. Discussion of just a couple of lines of argument suggests the dimensions of
such a debate. Fineman might respond to critics, for instance, by saying that, as long as women are not economically harmed by choosing
caretak.ing roles, we can afford to be indifferent about the continuation
of a traditional division oflabor. She might even invoke what has been
called "difference feminism" to argue that women's emphasis on performing the tasks of nurturance reflects a distinctive female orientation of care, which eschews a male model of identity based on
economic self-interest.169
This response in tum might provoke a reply that women's ten165. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
166. Albiston et al., supra note 128, at 177.
167. Id.
168. "[A]n end to the law's complicity in inequalitarian norms may be a precondition of
reform and even a catalyst for it." Bartlett & Stack, supra note 119, at 30 (footnote omitted).
169. For various versions of this school of thought, see JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN,
PRIVATE WOMAN (1981); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); NELL NODDINGS,
CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudlcation, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
Fineman elsewhere has expressed her belief that "many women experience society in ways
significantly different from the ways that men experience society." Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L.
REV. 25, 37 (1990). She stresses that her approach "is based on experiential, not essential differences," which flow from "a variety of experiences - material, psychological, physical, social,
and cultural." Id.
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dency to assume primary caretaking responsibility reflects not so
much the operation of a distinct set of feminine values as the influence
of a system of gender domination. 170 The embrace of domesticity may
be rational within that structure of choices, but it does not necessarily
represent an outcome that women would choose were they not constrained by social pressures and a segregated job market. But if that is
true, a rebuttal might ask, won't our failure to compensate women for
the assumption of domestic responsibility in effect penalize women for
"choices" that they did not freely make?
Another reply to Fineman's argument might be that we have reason to be concerned about the traditional division of labor even if women suffer no economic disadvantage as a result of it. Some scholars
argue that female-dominated child care plays a powerful role in generating dynamics of personality development that perpetuate male domination.171 These analysts focus on the emotionally charged nature of
the infant's pre-Oedipal interaction with her caretaker, usually the
mother. The infant's condition of absolute dependence, they theorize,
gives rise both to rage at the mother as well as the expectation that her
needs naturally will be effaced for the sake of others. These deeply
rooted sentiments then contribute to the systematic devaluation of women's experience. We have barely begun to explore the implications of
these ideas for family law. 172 Nonetheless, they arguably should at
least give us pause before we assume that economic dependence is the
only reason for concern about a division of labor by gender. In tum, a
rebuttal might draw on critiques of psychoanalytic tenets and their
application to gender relations and the law.113
These are but a few of the issues that a broader conception of law
forces us to confront in discussing divorce reform. They reflect awareness of the dynamic relationship among law, behavior, and culture, in
which legal reforms adopted within a given social context in tum have
the potential to change the contours of that context. They remind us
that our actions often have unexpected and far-flung consequences
that resonate both on a material and symbolic level. Ideally, we may
want, as Herma Hill Kay put it, "a nonpunitive, nonsexist, and
nonpatemalistic system of marriage dissolution built on sharing prin170. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 37, at 802-06.
171. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); DOROTHY
DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976). Chodorow has sought to add more

layers of complexity to her initial formulation; a sense of the evolution of her thought can be
gained from the essays contained in NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY (1989). For a critique of The Reproduction ofMothering that stresses the importance of
considering factors such as race and class, see ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN
80-113 (1988).

172. One attempt to do so is Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In
Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1483 (1991).
173. See, for example, the essays collected in the symposium on Chodorow's ideas, On The
Reproduction of Mothering: A Methodological Debate, 6 SIGNS 482 (1981).
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ciples." 174 As the discussion in this section indicates, however, there is
considerable internal tension among the elements in such a formula.
Fineman's rigid dichotomy between law as cause and law as effect, and
between the symbolic and the concrete, unfortunately limit the extent
to which her book provides guidance in the face of our dilemma.
Fineman also limits the value of her contribution by positing another rigid dichotomy: equality versus equity. Although she educates
us about the perils of an uncritical embrace of equality, her categorical
rejection of that concept neglects equality's potential to challenge the
inequity that she decries.
VI.

EQUALITY AND EQUITY

Commitment to the principle of equality has been a failure in family law, Fineman argues, because it has produced inequitable results.
Women and children tend to be much worse off than men as a result of
divorce, primarily because of divorce rules that ignore their vulnerability for the sake of adherence to an abstract ideal of equality. As a
result, we must choose between equality and equity. Because equality
rhetoric is "too easily appropriated and utilized to gain support for
antifeminist measures," Fineman maintains that "it would seem time
to abandon equality" (p. 190). In other words, if you want justice,
don't pursue it in the name of equality. 175
Fineman's critique throughout her book, however, is not of equality rhetoric in all its forms, but of a particular instance of it: " 'rule,'
or formal, equality" (p. 3). Rule equality demands that formally neutral rules be applied to all, so that everyone is treated the same. It
proceeds on the assumption that people are essentially the same, so
that the burden of proof is on those who advocate different treatment.
By contrast, "result-equality" (p. 3) seeks to ensure that "the effects of
rules as they will be applied will place individuals in more or less equal
positions" (p. 3). Result equality thus may require unequal formal
treatment. Given women's disadvantage in the market, Fineman contends, feminists should have made result equality the guiding principle
of divorce reforms (p. 4). Instead, because of the desire for a symbolic
assertion of the principle that men and women are basically the same,
gender-neutral rule equality dominated reform efforts.
Fineman's analysis is consistent with that of other recent feminists
who have criticized rule equality as insensitive to the ways in which
men and women are not similarly situated. 176 Furthermore, these crit174. Henna Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE
supra note 9, at 6, 36.
175. Seep. 2 ("[l]n order to do equity we must move away from equality as the grand principle in family law reform....").
176. See, e.g., ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980);
Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. Cr. REv. 201; Lucinda M.
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ics argue, the determination of whether persons are the same often
implicitly uses a male standard as its conception of the individual. Lucinda Finley, for instance, has observed that the law has required employers to make numerous accommodations for employees to
participate in military service, the vast majority of whom are male.
Only a very small percentage of employees receive these benefits, but
the accommodations tend not to be seen as "special" provisions for
workers who are "different" from others. 177 By contrast, an argument
for pregnancy leave tends to be cast as a request for "special" treatment because women are "different" from other workers. The explanation in each instance is the implicit use of a model based on male
experience. 178
Fineman thus draws on a cogent critical perspective in her contention that rule equality may have diminishing returns as a vehicle for
gender justice. More problematic, however, is her move from this
proposition to the categorical rejection of equality as a source of inspiration because of its association with rule equality. This seems unnecessarily sweeping. To be sure, there may be a tendency in American
culture to associate equality in general with rule equality in particular.
Fineman observes that equality has a distinct legal history, which creates the danger that reforms pursued under its banner will be "confused and confounded by the legalistic meaning and content of the
term" (p. 35). The passage of the Equal Protection Clause, for instance, after a period of formal legal discrimination, and the construction of that Clause to encompass formal but not substantive
equality, 179 surely contributes to a perception that equality means rule
equality. Fineman's mindfulness of this powerful pull toward a particular conception of equality therefore seems sensible.
Fineman's conclusion that this warrants rejecting any appeals at
all to equality seems premature, however. First, it neglects recent feminist scholarship that has attempted to reformulate a conception of
equality that rests not on the demonstration that men and women are
the "same," but on the accommodation of difference. 18° Christine LitFinley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
177. See Finley, supra note 176, at 1176.
178. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 75 (1990) ("The assumptions that differences lie within people obscures the fact
that they represent comparisons drawn between people, comparisons that use some traits as the
norm and confirm some people's perceptions as the truth while devaluing or disregarding the
perspectives of others.").
179. See, e.g.. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting challenge under equal
protection component of Due Process Clause to hiring test that blacks failed four times as often
as whites); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting equal protection challenge to school financing scheme that resulted in disparities in funds available for public
school districts).
180. This difference may be socially constructed or biological.
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tleton, for instance, has acknowledged that formal legal equality is of
minimal use when we encounter "real" difference, that it often is available only if a woman's experience can be analogized to a man's, that it
treats "difference" as located "within" women, and that it assumes
gender-neutral institutions with respect to which men and women are
similarly situated. 181 Littleton, nonetheless argued that the wholesale
rejection of equality in favor of concepts such as justice or "special
rights based on special needs" neglects the powerful potential of equality rhetoric. 182 Equality serves to express a "consistent theme of belonging, of somehow 'counting' as human," 183 and is capable of
articulating "a commonality among human beings." 184 As a result,
while equality is now enmeshed in a system of gender, "it is capable of
having meaning beyond that system."t8s
Littleton offers a reformulation of equality in terms of "equality as
acceptance."18 6 This principle asserts that "[t]he difference between
human beings, whether perceived or real, and whether biologically or
socially based, should not be permitted to make a difference in the
lived-out equality of those persons." 187 The focus is not on whether
men and women are the same or different, but on the ways in which
any asserted differences are used to create and justify disadvantage. A
society animated by equality as acceptance will strive to make gender
differences "costless relative to each other," 188 so that those pursuing
either a "feminine" or "masculine" way of life will obtain "equal resources, status, and access to social decisionmaking." 189 Thus, for example, those who choose to concentrate on "socially female
occupations" such as childrearing should receive benefits comparable
to those who opt for "socially male occupations" such as law or
business. 190
181. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 15 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1306-08
(1987).
182. Id. at 1310.
183. Id. at 1284 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 1284 n.29. Littleton also suggests that equality analysis has the practical benefit
of offering "one of the few avenues by which concrete experiences of subordination can be translated into legal claims." Id. at 1284.
185. Id. at 1283.
186. Id. at 1285.
187. Id. at 1284-85 (emphasis omitted).
188. Id. at 1297.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1301. Although she proceeds from a somewhat different perspective, Mary
Becker offers some examples of how compensation might be provided so as to assure comparable
benefits for childrearers. Mothers could be given preferences in employment such as those given
veterans in many states: "Large employers could give mothers extended leaves while their children are young, just as they gave male inductees extended leaves for military service during the
operation of the draft"; and childrearers "could be given social security credits in their own
accounts" rather than be entitled only to claims as their husbands' dependents. Becker, supra
note 176, at 208-09.
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According to Littleton, equality as acceptance preserves the value
of equality rhetoric while responding to feminist critiques of formal
equality. It is able to account for the existence of "difference," focusing not on whether difference is an intrinsic trait but on what cultural
significance is ascribed to it. Furthermore, it recognizes that institutions are not necessarily gender neutral, so that women can be disadvantaged by the application of facially neutral rules. 191 Gender
privilege "depends on equality meaning sameness," 192 but equality as
acceptance acknowledges difference and emphasizes "how to achieve
equality despite it."193
Other feminists have offered similar alternative conceptions of
equality. Deborah Rhode stresses the limits of defining equality as the
requirement of "similar treatment for those similarly situated," 194 arguing that the law should focus not on gender difference but gender
disadvantage. Framed in this way, the issue is the extent to which
"sex-linked traits and values" 195 serve to justify disparities in "status,
power, and economic security." 196 In pursuing a "substantive commitment to gender equality," 197 Rhode urges, "we need not simply
mandates of equal treatment for women; we need strategies to secure
women's treatment as equals." 198 Similarly, Joan Williams suggests
that the problems with "sameness arguments" can be surmounted "if
we stress not sameness but equal dignity." 199 Assessments of sameness should be seen not as statements about the inherent qualities of
individuals, since we all differ in some way. Rather, they should be
regarded as judgments that whatever differences exist in a particular
context should not be deemed relevant to the issue at hand. 200 This
approach "links equality with questions of policy rather than
biology."201
These versions of equality point up the way in which equality
serves as a powerful implicit basis for judgments about the equity of
social arrangements. A concern that the needs of some people are being slighted, or that they receive fewer social goods than others, rests
upon the notion that each person is of equal worth. That women are
Littleton, supra note 181, at 1312-13.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1313.
RHODE, supra note 62, at 3.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 319.
Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Be. yond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 308.
200. Id.; see also Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33 (1988).
201. Williams, supra note 199, at 308 (footnote omitted).
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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often financially worse off than men after divorce matters to us if we
believe that the lives of men and women are of equal value, and may
not if we do not. Put differently, equality directs attention to the question of distributive justice: if people are equally entitled to well-being,
then they are equally entitled to "the means of well-being." 202 The
historical function of equality has been to challenge-indifference to distributive issues based on the greater valuation of some lives over
others. "We could say that respect is due to humanity as such," Jeremy Waldron has observed.203 "But 'equality' has the extra and important resonance of indicating the sort of heritage we are struggling
against. " 204
One heritage against which we are still struggling is a gender system that has disproportionately rewarded traditionally male pursuits
and devalued caretaking activities. 205 In the face of this history, a concept such as equality of acceptance can serve to "affirm the equal validity of men's and women's lives."206 Employed in this way, the
principle of equality can be used to challenge the propriety of facially
neutral rules, as those rules may not allocate goods in a way that assures men and women comparable well-being in their chosen ways of
life.201
The rhetoric of equality may also be important for another reason.
Fineman argues that modem family law tends to "cast [women] as
unencumbered, equally-empowered market actors" (p. 175), that the
typical model of mental health accepted by the helping professions is
based on "self-contained individualism" (p. 186), and that "market
ideology" has gained influence in family law (p. 25). Although
Fineman does not develop her analysis in precisely the same way,
these comments echo those of other observers who see market logic as
increasingly influential in modem life. 20s
202. Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41, 64 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
203. Jeremy Waldron, The Substance ofEquality, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1363 (1991) (book
review).
204. Id.
205. Carol Gilligan's work, for example, has been shaped by the sense that traditional moral
development theory has regarded as "normal" those experiences that are more typically male
than female in this culture. GILLIGAN, supra note 169, at 5-23. Gilligan's research has been a
reaction to the work of theorists such as Lawrence Kohlberg. See LAWRENCE KoHLBERG, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981).
206. Littleton, supra note 181, at 1313.
207. As I have noted, Fineman acknowledges this potential in what she describes as "result
equality." See pp. 3-4.
208. "The traditional liberal view, asserting that there must be a realm of personal interactions walled off from the market, is striving to hold some territory against the oncoming forces of
economics and the notion that everything is grist for the market mill." Margaret J. Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE 165, 166 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989); see also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN NATURE
(1986); ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION 27-104
(1989). The influence of market logic is reflected, for instance, in claims that economic analysis
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The "market" is of course a reifi.cation, but one of its functions in
American discourse has been to denote a realm of self-interested behavior in contrast to the ostensibly more altruistic realm of the family. 209 Although the family has been regarded as the institution that
responds to the inequality embodied in need and dependence, the market typically has been more tolerant of such disparities. Although this
tolerance has rested in part on utilitarian judgments of efficiency, it
has also drawn upon notions of individual autonomy and desert. 210
The relevant market actor is the abstract self-interested individual who
tries to maximize personal welfare through the exercise of rational
choice. 211 From this atomistic perspective, unequal outcomes in a
competitive market reflect returns to different amounts of skill or effort. On this view, the market is a true meritocracy: by forcing individuals to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions, it
encourages the cultivation of rational behavior.
Concern about the influence of market logic within the family thus
expresses the fear that principles such as self-interest and self-reliance
may become more prominent within family life. To the extent that a
market orientation "starts from a postulate of an essentially unsocial
nature of man," it leaves us "without any ethical principle that could
override the economic behaviour logically required of unsocial man,
i.e., pure individual maximizing behaviour."212 One reflection of this
might be a greater tendency to treat :financial disparities at divorce as
simply the natural result of different individual choices by men and
women about levels of career investment. Cast in this light, these disparities may seem less worthy of our attention, because redressing
them would subsidize misguided investment decisions. 213 Furtherprovides an overarching framework for analyzing diverse areas of human experience. See
Reuven Brenner, Economics - An Imperialist Science?. 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (1980); Jack
Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 53 (1985).
209. "The morality of altruism has been supposed to animate the family to the same extent
that the morality of individualism has been supposed to pervade the marketplace." Frances E.
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497, 1505 (1983); see also Judith Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEO. L.J. 1741, 1742 (1988)
(stating that in the market, self-interested behavior is "not only acceptable," but "is assumed to
benefit society"; in the family, by contrast, "relationships are premised on caring as much as on
self-gratification").
210. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
211. According to Alan Wolfe, the market is "an abstract process of calculating the economic gains and tosses associated with individual decision-making." WOLFE, supra note 208, at
28.
212. C.B. MACPHERSON, The Rise and Fall ofEconomic Justice, in THE RISE AND FALL OF
EcONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 1, 3 (1985). For an argument that an inherent justificatory principle of capitalism is in fact responsiveness to need, see Jonathan Riley, Justice Under
Capitalism, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE, supra note 208, at 122.
213. This of course is not the only conclusion that market logic might dictate. Those who
accept the behavioral assumptions of economic analysis might see spousal self-interest as served
by cooperative behavior within marriage. This is the point made by those economists who argue
that we need to compensate marriage-specific investments that yield greater benefits for spouses
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more, a wealthy husband divorcing a less wealthy wife may have difficulty accepting the idea that he has a responsibility to provide
assistance to someone who has not "earned" that assistance by providing enough benefits to warrant staying in the marriage. It seems reasonable to infer that Fineman believes that it is precisely this type of
market individualism that has exacerbated gender inequity at divorce.
Equality rhetoric, however, traditionally has served to limit the
reach of market principles. It has asserted that some outcomes are
simply unacceptable, regardless of how efficient they might be or how
much they might undermine a market meritocracy. As Gregory Vlastos has pointed out, the concept of merit focuses on particular attributes as the basis for ranking individuals.214 By contrast, equality
asserts that "the human worth of all persons is equal, however unequal
may be their merit." 215 If someone is valued on the basis of merit
alone, Vlastos has argued, that person "is not being valued as an individual. "216 Thus, an ex-spouse may be regarded as nonmeritorious according to market logic because of her irrational investment behavior.
Equality rhetoric offers an alternative reason for responding to her financial condition, however. Consequently, if we inhabit an era in
which the influence of market logic has increased, it seems especially
important to preserv.e a rhetoric that has enabled us to present a forceful challenge to that logic. Equality rhetoric has a deep resonance in
Western culture, especially in the United States, and we should be
wary of wholesale rejection of it as a language for framing claims for
social justice.
CONCLUSION

I have discussed various ways in which insistence on a purity of
vision undermines the contributions of The Illusion of Equality.
Fineman's determination to expose the inadequacies of equality theory
in family law leads her to eschew the qualifications or concessions that
would characterize a more inclusive perspective. It prompts her to
than would result from purely individually oriented behavior. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
This argument is still premised on the primacy of self-interested behavior and on the assumption that economic incentives are necessary in order to elicit altruistic behavior. Some have
suggested, however, that this model does not do justice to the sacrifice and altruism that does and
should characterize family life. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 102, at 242 (stating that insistence on recompense of economically rational spousal sacrifice "may undercut the sense that
spouses ought to have of obligation to the family and each other and of love for each other which
may itself be a sufficient basis for sacrifice"). By casting altruism as a form of self-interested
behavior, and by justifying concern for inequality in terms of preserving incentives for individually rational behavior, market logic may reinforce an individualistic ethic and an orientation
traditionally more tolerant of unequal outcomes.
214. Vlastos, supra note 202, at 52.
215. Id. at 51.
216. Id. at 52.
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offer unrelenting criticism of liberal feminists and to pose our choices
in terms of stark dichotomies.
The most useful way to think of this book, then, is as a polemic,
with both the virtues and defects of that form. As Thomas Grey reminds us, the value of a single-minded critique is that it "turns a more
intense light on certain aspects of experience than will ever be provided by more tolerant and catholic thinkers." 217 Fineman renders
service in demanding that we confront the gendered character of family life and in warning us against the reflexive application of comfortable legal concepts to family relationships. She forces us, in other
words, to rethink the familiar.
Ultimately, however, divorce law must contend with more complexity than Fineman is willing to acknowledge. We are both cause
and effect of the gender system, which means that we may unwittingly
reproduce it even as we seek its demise. Family law may well be a
small part of any effort to respond to injustice between men and women. Nonetheless, if it is to play even a minor role, we will need a
coherent theory of postdivorce obligation, a better grasp of how law
guides individual choices, more insight into how law shapes the ways
in which we orient ourselves as men and women, and a deeper understanding of the promise and peril of various versions of equality. In
short, we will need to find ways to move beyond the legacy of gender
even as we remain within its grip.

217. THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OP POETRY 74 (1991).

